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The Thrift Insurance Crisis
Since its founding in 1934, the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLlC) has
helped to prevent depositor runs and panics at
the thrift institutions it insures. Beginning in the
early 1980s, however, the FSLlC has faced a
growing threat to its ability to perform this func-
tion. indeed, with the number of thrift failures
and insolvencies at unheard-of levels, the FSLlC
is now insolvent to the extent of about $90 bil-
lion, according to Treasury Department esti-
mates. This Letter discusses why we are faced
with a problem of this magnitude and how we
might pay for its resolution.
Thrift failures
The large, unexpected rise in interest rates from
late 1979 through 1981 was the catalyst for the
crisis the thrift industry and the FSLlC now face
(although the rise in interest rates through the
entire latter half of the 1970s left the industry in a
vulnerable position). During this period, the cost
of many thrifts' deposits exceeded the yield on
the long-term fixed-rate mortgages they held.
This negative interest spread meant that the
market value ofthese institutions' assets had
fallen below that of their liabilities. Thus, except
for the thrifts with large equity capital cushions,
much of the rest of the industry was insolvent on
a market-value basis in 1981, even though the
book, or historical, values of assets and liabilities
tended to camouflage the problem. Moreover, if
the FSLlC had tried at this point to liquidate all
the market-value insolvent thrifts, it would have
been bankrupt as well.
These weak and insolvent thrifts faced enormous
incentives to pursue high-risk strategies. With
little or none of their own money at stake any
longer, owners ofthese institutions faced a
"heads-i-win, tails-you-Iose" situation. Iftheir
high-risk, high"return investments panned out,
they stood to profit handsomely. And if their
investments fared poorly, the burden fell on the
FSLlC. At the same time, the FSLlC itself was also
market-value insolvent and lacked the resources
to resolve the problems quickly. Thus, a policy of
capital forbearance was pursued in the hope that
interest rates would decline and the industry
would be restored to solvency. This approach
enabled weakened institutions to continue to
operate and take even greater risks. Also, Con-
gress relaxed restrictions on thrift activities,
thereby providing new opportunities for risk-
taking in activities that regulators were un-
accustomed to monitoring. These factors all
increased the risk exposure of the already
weakened insurance fund.
To make matters worse/during this period the
thrift industry also faced stiffer competition
from banks and even nonbank financial firms
that became major providers of home mortgages.
This reduced thrifts' interest margins and prof-
itability, which, in turn, further eroded thrifts'
capital base, thus providingan additional
incentive for ri'sk taking.
This confluence of economic and regulatory
events exposed a fatal flaw in the deposit insur-
ance system. By charging insurance premiums
unrelated to risk, deposit insurance provides an
incentive for excessive risk taking. This incentive
grows larger as institutions approach insolvency.
Thus,once the FSLlC no longer had sufficient
resources to close insolvent institutions, it was no
surprise that weak and insolvent institutions
created a large and growing problem.
How big is the problem?
Until recently, thrift industry spokesmen tended
to play down the extent ofthe problem. But
others argued that thrift losses were substantial.
These divergent estimates tended to confuse
policymakers and the public. Although Congress
authorized a $10.8 billion increase in FSLlC
borrowing in 1987 to resolve thrift insolvencies,
that amount proved, in hindsight, woefully
inadequate.
Currently, the estimates are converging at about
$90 to $100 billion-staggering figures by any
measure. Still, some economists argue the costs
could be as high as $200 billion. The ultimate
tally depends on the number of market-value
insolvent thrifts andthe extent to which they are
insolvent. Although the number of book-valueinsolvencies and book-value net worth are avail-
able, the FSLlC's cost when it liquidates or reor-
ganizes a failed thrift is equal to the difference
between the prices the institution's assets and
liabilities can be sold for on the open market.
Book accounting values have little relevance in
a liquidation.
ThrQugh theend..of 1988, the FSLl.C had resolved
over 200 savings and loan insolvencies, at an
estimated total costof approximately $40 billion.
A small number of theseresolutiQns entailed
liquidations but the majority involved merger,
reorganiz;ation, or purchase-of-asset and assump-
tion-of-IiabiIity arrangements. Ina Iiquidation,
the FSLlC generally liquidates the thrift's assets
and pays offthe insureddepositors,thereby in-
curringcosts equal tothedifference.between the
market values ofthe .assets and liabilities.Alter-
natively,.when the FSLlC reorganizes an ailing
thrift or arranges for anotherinstitution to take
control,it typically provides funds to bring the
acquired thrift5.rnarket-value networth.close to
zero as a necessary inducemer)t to theacquirer.
Also, the FSLlC may make guarantees to protect
the acquireragainst potential future. losses,
which can resulLin additi.onal future costs to the
FSLlC.
The Bush plan
In the plan recentlypresented.bythe Bush
Administration, officials estimate that an addi-
ti.onal $50 billion is neededto resolvethere-
maininginvolvencies. This figure brings the total
costto more than $90 bi)lion.This.amountisin
line with several other estimates, inc:luding that
of the FDIC, and is a reasonab.lgbencbmark
measure of th~currentsize ..of th~ FSLlC insolv-
ency (that .is,the.aggregatenegativenet worth of
insolvent institutions).
It isessentialtodistinguish between the current
size oftheinsolvencyandthe stream offunds
thatmightfinance a soluti.on tothat problem
over time. There are several ways this $90 billiqn
could be financed. For example, theentire
amount could be funded through the issuance of
30-year,10 percent bonds. $9 billion per year
would be neededtocoverinterestcosts..lfthe
$90 bUlion principal.on.these bonds were not
amortized, itwouldbedueinJOyears. Oneway
to meetthat Qb)igation'\oVouldbe to purchase 30-
year,zero-coupon bonds,(1s the Adrninistratiqn
has propos~d. In this case, an additional$5.2
billion would be needed to purchase the zero-
coupon bonds, which, at an interest rate of 10
percent, would be worth $90 billion in 30 years.
Thrift industry resources
It is frequently argued that the savings and loan
industry holds tne primary responsibility for the
current crisis and, therefore, should bear the
burden of resolving the problem. Even if this is
so, the industry's resources are inadequate.
As of mid-year 1988, thrifts that were solvent
according to generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) had a net worth of only $34
billion exc:luding goodwill. Taking this as an
estimate ofmarket-value net worth (even though
regulatory incentives result in book net worth
that generally overstates market-value net worth),
the $34 billion would cover only a fraction of the
estimated cost of the FSLlC bailout. Thus, even if
all the net worth in the thrift industry could be
taxed, the proceeds would be inadequate. And it
is unreasonable to suppose such a draconian tax
could be imposed while still preserving the
industry.
A similar conclusion holds when one considers
the thrift industry's ability to bear the financing
costs. The Administration's plantoraisethe insur-
ance premium thrifts pay to 2J cents per $100 of
total liabilitieswould yield about $2.9 billion per
year, based on the industry's total liability base as
ofJune 1988. Even if all this premium income
couldbe used to service the bonds, $2.9 billion
is a far cry from the $9 billion annual funding
needed.
And even these premium figures are optimistic
becaus~ they assume no loss of deposits at thrift
institutions. Recent evidence is inconsistent with
this assumption. In December 1988, there was an
outflow of deposit liabilities at insured thrifts of
about $8 billion. Similarly, in January and Feb-
ruary, deposits fell by$10.7 billion and $8-9
billion, respectively. And thisdrawdown of
deposits continues apace in March. Moreover, it
will be extremely hard for thrifts to maintain their
deposit base in the long run since banks would
be paying a much lower premium of 15 cents per
hundred, to say nothing of nondepository com-
petitors that pay no insurance premium. In any
event,it probably will not be possible to use all
the premium incometoservicethe .interest cost
of the bonds since some will be needed toThe goal of such long-term reform should be to
eliminate the incentives the bank and thrift in-
surance funds provide for excessive risk taking.
Many approaches to reform are possible. The
main issue is to ensure that if banks and thrifts
choose to take risks, their owners' funds are on
the line, and not the taxpayers'.
Never again
Equally important is the need to ensure that
future thrift insolvencies will not require the use
of general taxpayers' funds. The Administration
proposal takes several important steps in this
direction, mainly by imposing more stringent
capital adequacy and regulatory standards on
thrifts. Moreover, it proposes a detailed study of
long-term depositinsurance reform.
banking industry to further taxes. However, such
taxes would impose a tremendous burden on the
industry. Banks would face a large competitive
disadvantage relative to money market funds and
other financial firms that could offer bank-like
services without the regulatory burden of the
additional tax. Moreover, from equity considera-
tions, there seems little reason to single out the
banking industry now and in the future to pay for
past thrift insolvencies.
In the final analysis, if the deposit insurance
guarantees are to be honored, several billion
dollars of additional funds per year must be
obtained from another source, presumably gen-
eral taxpayers. It is important to allocate suffi-
cient funds to resolve current thrift insolvencies
quickly. Delay will increase the ultimate cost
since the longer insolvent and near-insolvent
thrifts continue in operation, the greater will be





resolve future thrift failures. Also it would be
prudent to set some aside to build a reserve fund,
as the Bush plan proposes.
Some have proposed tapping the net worth of
the Federal Home Loan Banks to raise additional
funds. Since the Home Loan Banks are owned
by the thrift industry, this would reduce the net
worth of thrifts commensurately. Tapping the
Home Loan Banks' net worth or retained earn-
ings is a viable way to tax the thrifts' net worth,
but the Banks are not an independent source of
funds.
It might be conceivable to raise sufficient
revenues for the FSLlC problem by subjecting the
Whoelse might pay?
It is obvious that the thrift industry itself does
not have sufficient resources to pay the total cost
of resolving the FSLlC's insolvency. Some have
argued that insurance premiums paid by com-
mercial banks to their insuring agency, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
might be an appropriate source of funds. Domes-
tic deposits of all FDIC-insured banks in the
United States were approximately $2 trillion as
of the middle of 1988. At the proposed premium
of 15 cents per $100 of deposits, these deposits
would produce about $3 billion in premium
income each year.
Even if the banks' entire $3 billion premium
income could be used for this purpose, the
combined bank and thrift premium income still
would not pay the $9 billion annual interest on
the bonds used to resolve current thrift insolv-
encies. Moreover, the Bush plan calls for using
the larger bank insurance premium only to in-
crease the reserves of the FDIC. This is appropri-
ate, considering that the number of bank failures
is at a record high and the FDIC's reserves per
deposit dollar are near an all-time low.
Monetary Policy Objectives for 1989
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan presented a report to the Congress on the Federal
Reserve's monetary policy objectives for 1989 on February 21. The report includes a summary of
the Federal Reserve's monetary policy plans along with a review of economic and financial devel-
opments in 1988 and the economic outlook in 1989. Single or multiple copies of the report can
be obtained upon request from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco, CA 94120; phone (415) 974-2246.
Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, or of the Board.of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor (Barbi!ra Bennett) or to the author.... Free copies of Federal Reserve
publications can be obtained from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702,
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